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A key concern in countries contemplating reasonably aggressive emissions reduction|
which has become still more prominent since the crisis, as they struggle to restore employ-
ment|is the fear that their competitive position in world markets jeopardized, by `carbon
leakage' as production shifts elsewhere.1 The likelihood that any mitigation measures will
be strongly asymmetric, at least for coming years, ampli¯es this concern, which is re°ected
in the inclusion in climate change legislation in both EU2 and in proposals elsewhere (such
as the Waxman-Markey bill in the U.S.) of provisions, for exposed emissions-intensive
sectors, for various forms of `border tax adjustment' (BTA)3|meaning the levying of
some charge on imports, and remission of charge on exports, to the extent that carbon
prices are higher domestically than elsewhere. Unsurprisingly, the appropriateness or not
of such adjustments has been the focus of heated debate.
The theoretical literature has begun to address the linkages between climate (environ-
ment, more generally) and trade policies that are the heart of this question. Much of
it has focused on non-cooperative policy formation, commonly characterizing nationally
optimal policy, or desirable directions of reform|whether for small or large economies|
when one or other instrument, environment or trade, is for some reason constrained
away from the optimal: see, among others, Markusen (1975), Baumol and Oates (1988),
Copeland (1994), Hoel (1996) and Turunen-Red and Woodland (2004). This is clearly an
important perspective, capturing the element of the policy concern that relates directly
to national self-interest. But an understanding of the requirements of cooperative policy
is also needed: much of the reason why the EU and other advanced economies consider
undertaking aggressive mitigation policies, for instance, has less to do with the harm they
might themselves su®er from unmitigated climate change than with their concern with
(and some historic guilt) for the harm that might be su®ered by others. Not least be-
cause of the importance of the rhetoric of cooperation in relation to climate policies, the
implications of cooperative design provide a central benchmark for policy evaluation.
This collective perspective has received far less attention (an exception being the partial
equilibrium treatment in Gros (2009)). The aim in this paper is therefore to explore
the interaction between climate and trade policies in that context. It provides a general
1For insightful discussion on these issues see Copeland and Taylor (2004) and Sheldon (2006). Levin-
son and Taylor (2008) provide empirical evidence that more stringent environmental regulation reduces
exports.
2Adjustments of this kind, in the context of the EU Emission Trading System, are provided for in
Directive 2009/29/EC amending Directive 2003/87/EC. The failed Australian cap-and-trade proposals,
in similar spirit, also included provision for allocation of free allowances to exposed sectors.
3Also advocated by, for instance, Stiglitz (2006).
1treatment, within the standard general equilibrium model of competitive trade, of Pareto-
e±cient design of climate and tari® policies, unifying and extending results in this area.
The central question of interest here is whether there are circumstances in which some
form of BTA is part of a globally e±cient response to climate change (or to any other
environmental problem with broadly the same border-crossing structure). By `border tax
adjustment' we mean, in the broadest sense, di®erential taxation of tradable commodities
that is driven by di®erences in underlying national carbon prices. Of particular interest
is the possibility that this adjustment will take the very simple form commonly envisaged
in policy discussions|which is likely the only one conceivably practicable|of setting a
charge on imports equal to some notion of carbon tax `not paid' abroad on imports, and
remitting tax on exports in similar fashion.
There are of course many other issues raised by the possibility of BTA for carbon prices.
These include the questions of whether or not such adjustment is WTO-consistent (see,
for instance, Chapter 5 of OECD (2004)),4 very signi¯cant issues of implementability
(Moore, 2010); and, not least, the (perhaps limited) empirical signi¯cance of the relative
producer e®ects of carbon pricing that might be adjusted for (Houser et al. 2008). Nor
does the analysis here considers the potential merit of BTA as a credible device by which
countries implementing carbon pricing can encourage participation by others.5 Important
though they are, these are not the concern here|which is with the pure e±ciency case
for climate-motivated border tax adjustment.
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section II sets out the model, which takes carbon
taxation to be the instrument of climate policy, and Section III then derives benchmark
results for collectively e±cient carbon tax and tari® policy when all instruments can be
freely set. Section IV establishes the case for some form of border tax adjustment when
instruments are constrained in some countries, which Section V then explores in more
detail. Section VI considers the case in which at least some countries use not carbon
taxation but a cap-and-trade scheme. Section VII concludes.
4There are precedents, notable in the US Superfund tax and, of particular relevance in the climate
context, for ozone-depleting chemicals.
5Participants themselves presumably gain from the BTAs, and non-participants would then bene¯t
by imposing a carbon price themselves, at least to the extent that since by doing so they would capture
revenues otherwise accruing to others (though terms of trade e®ects would also play a role).
2II. Modeling climate and trade policies
The framework is that of Keen and Wildasin (2004), modi¯ed to deal with pollution as a
by-product of production. We consider a perfectly competitive general equilibrium model
of international trade in which there are J countries indexed by the superscript j. In each
country there is a a representative consumer and a private sector that produces (only)
N tradeable commodities. The N-vector of international commodity prices is denoted
by w.6 (All vectors are column vectors, and a prime indicates transposition). Trade is
subject to trade taxes or subsidies, the vector of which is denoted in country j by ¿ j
consistent with most-favored nation rules, each country is assumed to apply the same
tari® rates to all others.7 The commodity price vector in country j is then given by the
N-vector pj = w +¿ j. Consumption taxes are readily shown to be optimally zero in the
present setting, so they are simply excluded.
The production of each commodity generates some pollutant|we have in mind carbon
emissions, though there are of course many other possible interpretations8|with the N-
vector zj denoting emissions in country j. Total emissions in country j are thus given by
¶0zj where ¶ is the N-vector of 1s; and global emissions, on which|as with the concen-







This damage is assumed to arise (only) directly in consumer welfare, not through produc-
tion; though perhaps not the most realistic assumption in the climate context, this helps
relates our results to most familiar approaches in the literature.















6Though world prices are something of a ¯ction, in the sense that no private agent may trade at them,
they do matter for the revenues that national governments collect.





i < 0) and commodity i is being imported by country j, then ¿
j
i is an import tari® (import subsidy);
if i is exported by country j then ¿
j
i is an export subsidy (export tax).
8And generalizations too. The analysis and main results are readily generalized to allow for M-
types of pollutants. Much the analysis would apply to other pollutants, such as CFCs, whose emissions
disperse uniformly in the atmosphere. An alternative speci¯cation, capturing varying degrees (and their






, where bji 2 [0;1] indicates the extent to which the emission discharges of country i
spillovers to country j. This though does not add signi¯cant insights to what follows.
3with ej
p the vector of compensated demands and e
j
k > 0, assumed strictly positive in all
countries, the compensation required for a marginal increase in global emissions.
Emissions zj are subject to pollution taxes, given by the N-vector sj; these note, are in
general sector-speci¯c.9 The production sector in country j is competitive and character-




















where T j (vj) is the technology set, vj being the vector of factor endowments, and yj
is the (net) output of tradeable goods. The revenue function in (3) is convex, linearly
homogeneous function of prices, and assumed to be twice continuously di®erentiable.10
(The fossil fuels from whose use carbon emissions arise are not explicitly identi¯ed, though
they can be thought of as being amongst the N commodities, since our interest here is not
in their pricing). Hotelling's lemma implies that rj
p is the vector of net supply functions
for tradeable commodities; it also follows from (3) that rj
s (pj;sj) = ¡zj: emissions are
given by (minus) the derivative of the revenue function with respect to the sectoral carbon
tax rates.
Tax revenues from all sources are assumed to be returned to the consumers in a lump
sum fashion. At some points, unrequited commodity transfers between countries will be
allowed; denoting by the N-vector ®j that received by j, these must satisfy
XJ
j=1 ®
j = 0N£1 : (4)
































This simply says that expenditure ej(uj;pj;kj) must equal GDP, given by rj(pj;sj), plus






and transfers received by country j; the value of which is w0®j.















= 0(N¡1)£1 ; (6)
where, by Walras' Law, the market-clearing equation for the ¯rst commodity is dropped.
9As in, among others, Copeland (1994), Hoel (1996) and Turunen-Red and Woodland (2004).
10For the properties of the revenue function see Dixit and Normal (1980) and Woodland (1982).
4The same commodity is taken as numeraire, and without loss of generality, to be untaxed
in all countries: so ¿
j
1 = 0 and p
j
1 = 1, for j = 1;:::;J.
Given tari®s ¿ j and carbon tax vectors sj, for j = 1;:::;J, a vector of international
transfers satisfying (4), the market equilibrium conditions (6), and the national budget
constraints (5), the system may be solved for the equilibrium world price vector w and
the vector of national utilities u = (u1;:::;uJ)0.11
The analysis that follows uses Tucker's Theorem of the Alternative to characterize Pareto-
e±cient environmental and tari®s structures. The necessary conditions for this are de-
rived in Appendix A. They involve variables ¾j that can be interpreted as the (negative)
of the implicit social marginal value|evaluated at the Pareto-e±cient allocation being
characterized|of the utility of country j.12 If country i, say, is more `income-needy' than
country j, then ¾i < ¾j.
III. Unconstrained carbon tax and tari® policies
To ¯x ideas, this section considers the relatively straightforward case in which there are
no constraints on the carbon taxes and tari®s that can be set in any country. Then:13
Proposition 1 At any Pareto-e±cient allocation, in every country j:












so that for any countries j and i, sj = µijsi À 00
1£N, where µij = ¾i=¾j.





Proof: See Appendix B.
The interpretation of part (a) is straightforward. Pareto e±ciency requires that each
country set its carbon tax in each sector n to equate the value of the income loss that a
11Di®erentiability of all functions at the initial equilibrium is assumed. Standard assumptions hold so
an equilibrium exists.
12If policy were evaluated by an explicit social welfare function !(V 1;:::;V J), V l being indi-











< 0 with ´l = el
pu=el
u; el





relates to the Hatta normality condition: see Turunen-Red and Woodland (1988).
13The notation q À 0 means that all elements of the vector q are strictly positive.
5small increase in its carbon tax causes itself, ¾jsj
n, to the sum of the marginal bene¯ts
conveyed to all countries by a marginal cut in emissions,
PJ
i=1 ¾iei
k. An immediate im-
plication, since the marginal damage from emissions is the same whichever sector they
originate in, is that each country should apply the same carbon tax to all activities: within
each country, carbon taxes are optimally uniform across sectors. But while each country
sets a single carbon tax rate, part (a) also shows that the level of that tax generally di®ers
across countries. Recalling the interpretation of ¾j, Pareto e±ciency requires that more
`income-needy' countries impose lower carbon taxes.14 This is intuitively natural, and to
the same e®ect consistent with the results of Chichilnisky and Heal (1994) and Sandmo
(2005, 2006)|and indeed with much of the policy debate, which has emphasized the lesser
ability of lower income countries to cope with aggressive carbon pricing. There is though
one subtle di®erence between this and previous results: here the simple equity-based mod-
i¯cation of the Pigovian rule applies even though distorting taxes|tari®s|may also be
deployed.
This brings us to part (b) of Proposition 1, which is more striking. To see why Pareto
e±ciency requires collinear tari® vectors, consider some change in world prices that in-
creases country j's import of good n by one unit, and increases i's exports by one unit.
With carbon taxes optimally set, this increases the shadow value of j's real income by
¾j¿j
n and reduces that of i by ¾i¿i
n; Pareto e±ciency then requires that ¿j
n = (¾i=¾j)¿i
n;
and this can hold for all n only if the tari® vectors are collinear. The importance of
this is in emphasizing that production ine±ciency is generally part of a Pareto e±cient
allocation. To see this, recall that producer prices in country j are pj = w + ¿ j ; this
means that global production will be e±cient|in the narrow sense that it is impossible
to increase global output of any good without either reducing the global output of some
other or increasing aggregate emissions|only if the tari® vectors ¿ j are the same for all
countries. But there is no reason to suppose that ¿ j = 0(N¡1)£1 for all countries, nor that
µij = ¾i=¾j takes the same value for all j.
There is generally production ine±ciency in allocations characterized by Proposition 1 in
a broader sense too, re°ecting also environmental concerns. Maximizing the net output
of some good without either reducing the net output of any other or increasing global
emissions requires that both producer prices p and carbon taxes s be equalized across
countries. Proposition 1 points to violations on both of these margins (or neither), driven
by distributional concerns: in each case, relative welfare weights shape the proportionality
factor between the (sectorally uniform) carbon taxes and tari®s applied by each country.
14Notice that part (a) of Proposition 1 relates to the analysis in Chichilnisky and Heal (1994), but the
analysis here is casted in terms of explicit ¯scal instruments.
6Proposition 1 applies whether or not international transfers between countries can be
deployed. If they can be then, of course, Pareto-e±ciency requires equalizing the ¾j
across countries. Part (a) of Proposition 1 then implies that Pareto e±ciency requires
the same level of carbon taxes in every country, and part (b) that ¿ j = ¿ i. All Pareto-
e±cient allocations are thus characterized by production e±ciency. The same may be
true, however, even without international transfers. The reason is as in Keen and Wildasin
(2004), and Turunen-Red and Woodland (2004): if there are more goods on which the
tari® rates may be varied than there are countries (and su±cient rank in the corresponding
matrix of net exports), o®setting tari®s can be designed so as to achieve any desired
reallocation of tari® revenue between countries. Explicit transfers are then redundant.
Hence:
Proposition 2 If there are no constraints on lump transfers between countries, or there
are at least as many goods as countries (and an appropriate rank condition is satis¯ed),
then, at any Pareto-e±cient allocation, for all countries i;j:
















Proof: See Appendix C.
Carbon taxes are thus set at ¯rst best Pigovian levels, and tari® policy has no substantive
role (but could be normalized away, for instance, by inclusion in the common vector of
world prices w).
In the relatively unconstrained world of Propositions 1 and 2, the alignment of climate
and trade policies is, thus, fairly straightforward. Importantly for present purposes, while
tari® policy is generally not redundant there is nothing in Propositions 1 and 2 that is
in the nature of a border tax adjustment. A case for BTA can thus arise only in more
constrained circumstances, and it is this possibility that we now turn.
7IV. Pareto e±ciency and the role of border tax ad-
justments
Imagine then that for some reason|perhaps unmodeled political constraints|not all
carbon taxes and tari®s are freely variable. Speci¯cally, suppose|going to something
of the opposite extreme to the circumstances of the previous section|that they can be
freely set in country h but everywhere else are ¯xed at arbitrary levels. We refer to
these countries as `unconstrained' and `constrained' respectively (and occasionally to h
as `home'), and will have in mind in the informal discussion that carbon taxes in the
latter|which may be sector-speci¯c|are `too low' (relative to the ¯rst-best Pigovian
carbon-tax). The global economy is thus constrained15 inside the global utility possibility
frontier, and the question is: How should carbon taxes and tari®s then be set in country
h?
The following result establishes the two key features of any constrained Pareto-e±cient
allocation in these circumstances (now reverting to a world in which it may not be possible
to fully address all equity concerns):
Proposition 3 Suppose that carbon taxes and tari®s are ¯xed at arbitrary levels in all
countries except h. Then constrained Pareto e±ciency requires that:


































































































Proof: See Appendix D.
Part (a) of Proposition 3 shows that that the unconstrained carbon tax in country h is not
set equal to the welfare-weighted marginal damage from emissions. This is because the
15Leaving aside the case in which the arbitrary rates in all unconstrained countries happen to coincide
with those of some Pareto e±cient allocation.
8carbon tax set in h, by a®ecting emissions and hence demand structures in the constrained
countries, impacts distortions associated with the tari®s set there. To the extent, for
instance, that the fall in emissions implied by increasing the carbon tax in h increases
demand in some constrained country j of goods that tari® distortions imply are under-
imported there (the tari® imposed by country j being greater than any export subsidy
imposed by country h), so that
¡
¾h¿ h ¡ ¾j¿ j¢0 e
j
pk¶0 < 00
1£N, this calls for sh to be set
higher than would otherwise be the case. In this way, the unconstrained carbon tax is
used to reduce the distortions associated with imperfections of collective tari® policies.
If, for example, a warming in climate leads in country j to reduced demand for heating
equipment that is subject to a large import tari®, this becomes an argument for a higher
carbon tax in country h.
One other aspect of part (a) bears emphasis: since sh is collinear with ¶, the carbon tax
in the unconstrained country h should be uniform across sectors, whether or not it is
uniform in the constrained countries. The best way to respond, if need be, to sectoral
di®erentiation abroad, is through the tari® structure. The proper task of the carbon tax
is to address ine±ciencies in the level of emissions.
Part (b), characterizing Pareto e±cient tari® design in country j, is still more complex,





¾hsh ¡ ¾jsj¢0 rj
sp^ ¼
¡1
pp that re°ects di®erences in carbon taxes between
the unconstrained and all other countries, adjusted for equity considerations and re°ecting
too the extent to which production in the constrained countries is a®ected by the carbon
taxes applied there. This then is a BTA in the broad sense de¯ned in the introduction,
with a pivotal role played by the responsiveness of net outputs to the local carbon taxes,
as given by the matrix16 rj
sp. If rj
sp = 0N£(N¡1); so that carbon taxation has no impact
on production in the constrained country, this BTA-type term vanishes.17
ii) An aggregate of the terms-of-trade-e®ects arising in each country from changes in




pp, giving the welfare-
weighted sum of the changes in real income generated in each country by increasing tari®s

















pp, similar to that in part (a) of the
16This is Copeland's (1994) indicator of sectoral pollution intensity.
17This is closely related to the observation of Lockwood and Whalley (2010) that a case for BTA can
arise only when di®erential carbon taxes a®ect relative producer prices: otherwise the exchange rate (or
domestic price level) will accommodate such di®erences automatically.
9Proposition, but now re°ecting the impact on tari® distortions of the change in emissions
induced by changing tari®s in country h rather than those from changing carbon taxes.
iv) The change in welfare-weighted tari® revenues
PJ




pp (in all constrained
countries) brought about by increasing tari®s in h.
The fairly general case of Proposition 3 is clearly also fairly complex and opaque. For
further insight, the next section turns to various special cases.
V. Border tax adjustment with ine±cient carbon pric-
ing: Further analysis
A ¯rst simpli¯cation is to suppose that there are only two countries, that international
transfers can be freely deployed (so that ¾j is equated across countries), and that com-
pensated demands for the non-numeraire commodities are independent of emissions,
e2
pk = 0(N¡1)£1. Then Proposition 3 gives:
Corollary 1 Suppose there are only two countries, 1 and 2, with carbon taxes and tari®s
in country 2 ¯xed at arbitrary levels, that lump sum transfers between the two countries
are unconstrained and that compensated demands for the non-numeraire commodities are































Now the unconstrained Pigovian tax is set at its ¯rst-best Pigovian level, for reasons clear
from the discussion of Proposition 3(a). And the unconstrained tari®|more precisely,
the di®erence between the unconstrained and constrained tari®|di®ers from zero only to
the extent that the carbon tax abroad is not set at its ¯rst best level. In this case, the
sole purpose of tari® policy is thus to provide a border tax adjustment.
The nature of the BTA called for is though somewhat complex, re°ecting the respon-
siveness of net import demand, and the impact of carbon pricing on emissions, in the
constrained country. (This, incidentally, provides an answer to one question that has
lingered in the literature: whether the border tax adjustment should re°ect technology in
the home or in the foreign country: Proposition 3 shows that constrained Pareto e±ciency
10requires that adjustment (both the tari® on imports and the refund on exports) be by the
latter).
To see the intuition underlying the form of BTA called for in part(b) of Corollary 1,
suppose for simplicity that (in addition to the assumptions of the corollary) all carbon
taxes and tari®s are zero in the constrained country, 2. Recalling that optimality requires
that any conceivable marginal change in policy have zero impact (given the availability of
international transfers) on the sum of utilities, consider the particular policy of combining
a change in world prices, and hence of producer prices in the constrained country, of
dw = dp
2 , with an o®setting change in the unconstrained tari®, d¿ 1 = ¡dw. It can
then be shown, since producer prices (and the carbon tax) in the unconstrained country



























s = ¡z2, the ¯rst e®ect on the right of (15) is ¡(e1
k + e2
k)dk2, where
k2 = ¶0z2 denotes aggregate emissions in country 2; this term thus captures the global
social bene¯t of any reduction in country 2's emissions induced by the change in producer
prices there. The second term is ¡¿ 10dm





, which in turn is equal in
equilibrium to ¿ 10dm
1; this e®ect, re°ecting the impact of the reform on the distortion of
trade implied by the initial tari® structure is thus harmful to the extent that it decreases
1's imports of goods that are subject to a positive tari®. Optimal policy implies balancing





















which is precisely as the two parts of Corollary 1 imply in this case. The kind of policy
this implies is a reduction in the producer price of `dirty' goods in the constrained country,
to discourage their production there, combined with|indeed induced by|a tari® that
o®sets the tendency for the unconstrained country to consequently import more of those
dirty goods.
A more direct piece of intuition may also be helpful. Imagine that both countries initially
set their carbon taxes at Pigovian levels (so that s1 = s2 ´ (e1
k + e2
k)¶), and deploy no
tari®s. Now suppose, however, the carbon tax is removed in country 2, and the tari® in
country 1 changed in response as Corollary 1 requires. To a linear approximation, the
18Since ej
u > 0, j = 1;2, is the reciprocal of the marginal utility of income the left hand side of (15)
represents the change in global utility in terms of the numeraire good.






















But (16) implies that dm
1 = 0(N¡1)£1. That is, optimal tari® policy in the unconstrained
country undoes the trade impact of suboptimal carbon pricing in the other country, as to
re-establish (approximately) the same pattern of net trade as prevails when both deploy
¯rst-best Pigovian taxes.
These results clearly in general imply quite complex structures for the optimal tari® rates
themselves. In the special case in which there are only two tradeable goods, one of
which (the numeraire) is `clean', in the sense that its production generates no pollution














The optimal tari® can thus be thought of attaching a shadow price to imports in the
unconstrained country that re°ects their contribution to emissions abroad.
But even the simple form of the optimal tari® in (18) is quite di®erent from the more
mechanical calculation commonly considered in the policy-oriented literature (and, likely,
the only type that could conceivably have su±cient veri¯ability for practical application).
This typically envisages charging on imports (and refunding on exports) an amount equal
to the shortfall of the carbon tax actually paid abroad, directly and indirectly, relative to









where the N-vector Á
2 gives emissions per unit of output, the typical element of the
matrix A2 is the use of good j per unit of gross output of n, and s1¤ ´ e1
k + e2
k is the
uniform Pigovian tax in the unconstrained country. To express the e±cient border tax
adjustment in these terms, it is shown in Appendix E, that if emissions per unit of output
(described by the vector Á
2) are constant in each sector and there are no substitution





































12Proposition 4 In the circumstances of Corollary 1, suppose further that emissions per
unit of output Á
2 are constant, there are no substitution e®ects in demand between non-
numeraire commodities (e2
pp = 0(N¡1)£(N¡1)), and that substitution between produced in-
puts is negligible (in the sense that the matrix A2 is independent of prices). Then, with
s1¤ = e1
k + e2











Here then is a case in which collectively e±cient policy has a remarkably simple form.
The unconstrained carbon tax should be set at the ¯rst-best Pigovian level, and border
tax adjustment should take the form of a countervailing charge on imports (and refund
on exports) corresponding mechanically to the tax `under-paid' in the foreign country.
One important di®erence from common proposals, however, is that, to the extent that
technologies di®er between the two countries, the rebate on exports will generally not
equal the carbon tax paid at home.
The assumptions needed to arrive at Proposition 4 are, of course, extremely strong. It
does suggest, nevertheless, that|conceptually at least|proposals for border adjusting
carbon taxes commonly encountered are not wholly misplaced, even from the perspective
of global rather than national welfare.
VI. Border tax adjustment and cap-and-trade
The analysis so far has assumed that the climate instruments deployed, if any, are in the
form of carbon taxes. An alternative, however, is cap-and trade: not levying a charge
directly on emissions, but instead issuing a ¯xed number of tradable emission rights. This
alternative is of considerable practical importance, perhaps even more so than carbon
taxation: as noted at the outset, it is schemes of this kind that have been adopted by the
EU and which have made most headway in the U.S. The question then is whether the
conclusions above continue to apply when the instrument of climate policy is not tax, but
national-level cap-and-trade.
The essence of the results in Section III|when instrument choice is unconstrained|
clearly apply essentially unchanged. This is a simple consequence of the familiar equiva-
lence, under perfect certainty (as assumed here) of carbon taxation and cap-and-trade,19
and of the result above that sectoral di®erentiation of carbon taxation (which could not
be replicated by permits tradable between sectors) cannot be part of a Pareto-e±cient
19There is large literature on the choice between taxation and cap-and-trade under uncertainty: see,
for instance, Pizer (2002).
13allocation: analogues of Propositions 1 and 2 thus hold with the characterizations of
carbon taxes reinterpreted as characterizing emissions caps in terms of the associated
shadow value of emissions. (Whether the pollution permits are auctioned or allocated
free of charge, critical in practice, is immaterial here, given the lump sum return of any
revenues raised.)
What though if, as in Sections IV and V, the instrument choice is constrained in some
country? (For brevity, we here assume just two-countries, with lump-sum transfers be-
tween them available; we also omit proofs20).
Suppose ¯rst that carbon taxation is used in the constrained country. Matters are then
straightforward, since any allocation that can be achieved when the unconstrained country
uses carbon taxation|as above|can be replicated by instead ¯xing there an appropriate
emissions level; and vice versa. So:
Proposition 5 Suppose carbon taxes are used in the constrained country. Then Propo-
sitions 3 and 4 and Corollary 1 continue to apply, appropriately reinterpreted, when the
unconstrained country uses cap-and-trade.
Things are very di®erent, however, if the constrained country uses cap-and-trade:
Proposition 6 Suppose the constrained country uses cap-and-trade. Then:
(a) At any Pareto-e±cient allocation at which that cap binds, no tari®s are levied
by the unconstrained country|so there is no border tax adjustment;
(b) At any Pareto e±cient allocation at which the cap does not bind, tari®s in
the unconstrained country embody border tax adjustments of the kind characterized in
Propositions 3 and 4 and Corollary 1 for the case in which the carbon tax in the constrained
country/ies is zero.
The intuition is straightforward. Policies adopted in the unconstrained country can have
no impact on emissions in the constrained country so long as the emission cap in the
latter is binding. So if it is Pareto e±cient for that cap to bind, deploying tari®s in
the unconstrained country can serve no useful purpose. So|following part (a) of the
proposition|there is no case for any BTA. It could be, however, that in some e±cient
allocations the unconstrained country sets its tari® so as to drive emissions abroad below
the cap. In that case, the situation in the constrained country is the same, at the margin,
as if it set a carbon tax of zero; and so|following part (b) of the proposition|the earlier
results for that case apply.
20These are straightforward once the structure of Section II is reformulated in terms of emission levels
rather than carbon taxes.
14It is part (a) of Proposition 6 that is, however, most striking. The point it makes appears
to have been largely unnoticed in the policy debate: while there may be a case in terms
of the collective good for BTAs when carbon taxes abroad are constrained at ine±ciently
low levels, there is no such case if it is instead emission targets abroad that are set at an
ine±ciently low (but binding) level.
VII. Concluding remarks
This paper has explored the interplay between climate- and trade-related instruments in
forming globally e±cient responses to climate concerns. One role that emerges for tari®
policies is in easing the constraints stemming from cross-country distributional concerns
that can make non-uniform carbon pricing e±cient. The other potential role, on which
most of the analysis has focused, is in mitigating distortions that arise from cross-country
di®erences in carbon prices. The paper has identi¯ed circumstances in which global
e±ciency does indeed require some form of BTA (and others in which it does not), and
has fully characterized the form of adjustment needed.
The ¯rst role emerges most clearly when there are no constraints on the rates at which
carbon taxes (or emission levels under cap-and-trade schemes) and tari®s can be set.
The implications of Pareto-e±ciency are then straightforward: carbon prices should be
uniform across sectors within countries (or permits tradable across them), but equity
considerations may call for them to be lower in countries judged less needy. The only
possible role for tari®s is as an indirect way to alleviate the underlying cross-country
equity concerns that can warrant di®erent carbon prices, a task quite di®erent from that
of responding to distortions arising from the di®erences in carbon prices.
It has also been seen, however, that global e±ciency requires a more purposive use of
tari® policy in recognition of climate concerns|a form of BTA|if climate policies are
constrained in countries that deploy carbon taxes. It remains optimal to set those carbon
prices that can be set freely|whether explicitly by taxation or implicitly by cap-and-
trade|in line with (a simple modi¯cation of) the Pigou rule (and not to di®erentiate them
across sectors). But tari®s should now be set so as to recognize the impact on emissions of
sourcing domestic demand from countries with carbon taxes that are inappropriate from
the collective perspective. The results here fully characterize the BTA required, and show
that in a special but instructive case, it takes the simple form|as envisaged in practical
policy debate and proposals|of a charge on imports (and rebate on export) equal to the
carbon tax 'not paid' abroad.
Importantly, this case for BTA does not apply if it is cap-and-trade policies, not carbon
15taxation, that is the constrained instrument. This is because emissions cannot then be
a®ected by policies elsewhere. While there has been some discussion of the practical
di®erences between implementing BTAs under carbon taxes and cap-and-trade, the wider
point that the underlying economic case is entirely di®erent in the two cases|and much
weaker under cap-and-trade|seems not to have been recognized. There may be a case
for BTA in terms of national self-interest; but in terms of collective e±ciency there is not.
The analysis here is of course severely limited in several respects. Factors have been
assumed immobile, for example, precluding the possibility of carbon leakage through
location choices that is a major concern in policy debates. And implementation of any
form of BTA in any event raises a host of legal and practical issues. What the analysis here
does establish, however, is that while practical proposals are naturally driven by national
(or sectoral) self-interest, a strong conceptual case can be made for the use of BTAs along
broadly the lines often proposed|in relation to carbon taxes, but not cap-and-trade|in
the more appealing terms of global e±ciency.
16Appendices
Appendix A: Necessary conditions for Pareto e±ciency
Perturbing (5) for country j, using (1), pj = w + ¿ j and recalling that rj









































































































































¢0 denoting the (N ¡ 1)-vector of imports of country j. Notice that
(A.5) and (A.7) refer to the e®ects on country j from changes in carbon taxes and tari®s
in all other countries.







































































Stacking now (A.1) for all countries j and (A.9) gives
¤udu = ¤wdw + ¤¿d¿ + ¤sds ; (A.13)
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Notice that ¤u is of dimension (J +N ¡1)£J, ¤w of dimension (J +N ¡1)£(N ¡1),
¤¿ of (J + N ¡ 1) £ J(N ¡ 1), and ¤s of dimension (J + N ¡ 1) £ JN.
By Tucker's theorem of the alternative,21 either the system in (A.13) has a solution with
du > 0J£1 for some perturbation (dw;d¿;ds) so that the initial equilibrium is Pareto







0; l = w;¿;s : (A.16)
It proves helpful, for later use, to partition the vector y = (¾;v)
0, where ¾ =
¡
¾1;:::;¾J¢0
and v = (v2;:::;vN)
0. ¤
Appendix B: Proof of Proposition 1
For the initial equilibrium to be Pareto-e±cient (and with explicit transfers unavailable),
it must be the case that (A.15) and (A.16) hold. It is straightforward to show|following
the same steps as in the proof of Proposition 3 below|that ¾j¿ j = v for every country j
and so for any pair of countries j and i it is the case that ¿ j = µij¿ i, where µij = ¾i=¾j,
21See Mangasarian (1969, p.24) for a statement.
18as required by part (b) of the proposition. Part (a) follows from making use of ¾j¿ j = v
into, following (A.16), y0¤s = 00
1£N. ¤
Appendix C: Proof of Proposition 2
With explicit lump-sum transfers the alternative also requires (with y = (¾;v;$)
0 ; now
















¡w0 00 ¢¢¢ 00
00 ¡w0 ¢¢¢ 0
. . .
. . . ... . . .
00 00 ¢¢¢ ¡w0
¹ 0 ¹ 0 ¹ 0 ¹ 0


























where ¹ 0 is a matrix of dimension (N¡1)£JN and ¤® is of dimension (J+N)£J(N¡1).









j = ¾ ; (C.4)
for all countries j = 1;:::;J.
With lump-sum transfers being unavailable, it can be easily veri¯ed|following from


























which upon using part (a), for every country j = 1;:::;J reduces to
^ M






























is the global import matrix with the element corresponding to the numeraire having been
removed from the matrix. This is of dimension (N ¡ 1) £ J but with at most J ¡ 1
independent columns. To solve for the vector ¾ one requires that the number of goods is
at least as large as the number of countries that is, N ¡1 ¸ J ¡1. If this is the case then
¾j = ¾; for j = 1;:::;J. ¤
19Appendix D: Proof of Proposition 3
This proceeds by supposing that all countries, except country h, are constrained in the














pu < 0; (D.1)




















































































































































































































Post-multiplying (D.6) by, assuming it exists, the inverse of rh
ss and substituting this into











h = v : (D.7)
Substituting now (D.7) into (D.6), and simplifying, gives (11). Country h's tari® vector in
(12) is now obtained by substituting (D.7) into, following from (A.16), y0¤w = 00
1£(N¡1),
and simplifying by making use also of (11) and (D.4). ¤
Appendix E: Derivation of equation 20
Recall that part (a) of Corollary 1 implies that carbon taxes are uniform|in the sense
that s1¤ = e1
k+e2
k|whereas part (b) implies, if there are no substitution e®ects in demand
(e2




















where g2 is gross output and ©2 is an N £N diagonal matrix, with the element Á2
n giving
the level of pollutant associated with the production of the nth good. Making use of the









where A2 is an N £ N matrix with the typical element a2
nj giving the use of good j per
unit of gross output of n. Substituting (E.3) in (E.2), and making use of the fact that
z2 = ¡r2
s and y2 = r2















Di®erentiating with respect to p2|and with ©2 being independent of p2|one, following






























where, following from Proposition 105 in Dhyrmes (1978), it is the case that
@
³












2¢¤¡1´ @vec([IN ¡ A2 (p2)])
@p2 ;
(E.6)
where vec([IN ¡ A2 (p2)]) denotes the N2-element column vector. Substituting (E.6)
into (E.5)|and appropriately replacing ©2 with the vector Á
2|and that into (E.1) one
arrives|abusing notation somewhat|at (20). ¤
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